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I. INTRODUCTION
Mexico's attitude on foreign direct investment in telecom-
munications has only superficially restored investor confidence
following the significant policy changes of the 1990s. By pass-
ing legislation to reduce investment barriers, a long era of inter-
nal economic disintegration came to an end, at least in theory.
The message that the Mexican government sent to investors
abroad is clear: Mexico is open for business. However, in order
to persuade venture capitalists that investing in Mexico is safe
and worthwhile, merely introducing a new legal framework
may not be sufficient to consistently attract long-term invest-
ments into the multi-billion dollar industry in Mexico.
Following an initial surge of foreign direct investment into
Mexico, particularly in the telecommunications market in the
1990s,' there has been a sense of uneasiness among investors
who have begun to realize that a number of problems accom-
pany Mexico's drastic foreign policy changes. The reduction of
foreign investment barriers has undoubtedly provided some re-
lief to eager investors, some of whom have finally been given the
opportunity to compete in a highly lucrative market. However,
it is naive and unrealistic for such companies to expect that a
country that had been dependent on nationalized industries for
decades would adjust to a free market environment without dif-
ficulty. Introducing competition is a long-term process, which
has been hindered in the Mexican telecommunications industry
by Telmex, the now privatized market dominator. Through
1 See Stephen I. Glover & JoEllen Lotvedt, The Mexican Telecommunications
Market: The Interplay of Internal Reform and NAFTA, 3 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV.
AM. 23, 30 (1997).
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Telmex's continued refusal to give up its monopoly, consumers
and most alternative telecom providers are unable to reap the
benefits of a truly competitive market in Mexico.
With a new wave of foreign telecommunication companies
interested in entering the market, Telmex is experiencing con-
tinued pressure to face competition. The potential benefits to
the Mexican public are vast in nature. However, with its para-
noid and monopolistic attitude, Telmex refuses to budge on an
extensive exclusivity deal it made with the government as part
of the de-nationalization of the telecom industry, thereby se-
verely limiting entrance and growth opportunities for other
companies in Mexico. Although some may argue that Telmex's
efforts to thwart the movement toward an open market is a nat-
ural reaction to the long-held nationalistic attitude within Mex-
ico, the empirical data throughout Latin American countries
suggests that inhibiting competition has resulted in slow
growth, slow innovation, and high prices. Therefore, it is time
for the Mexican administrative authorities and Telmex to coop-
erate in the effort to bring better telecommunication services
and selection to frustrated Mexican citizens by fostering
healthy competition.
The legal framework has been set forth by the necessary
administrative authorities through Mexico's accession to inter-
national treaties, as well as changes in Mexico's domestic regu-
lations. It is time for Telmex to follow the rules.
Part II of this comment addresses the milestone decision of
the Mexican government to privatize Telmex upon realizing
that de-nationalization was imperative for Mexico to improve
its outdated telecom infrastructure and technology. Part III ex-
plores the political history of foreign direct investment in Mex-
ico ranging from the open market policies of the early 20th
century, through a gradual nationalistic development, and back
to the open market tendencies at the end of the century. Part
IV discusses administrative liberalization via the 1993 General
Foreign Investment Law, as well as the 1995 Telecommunica-
tions Law through which the Mexican government attempted to
officially give teeth to its new open-door investment policy. Part
V discusses the significance of Mexico's accession to the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and the obligations that follow from
multilateral commitments in the investment industry over the
(Vol. 14:211214
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol14/iss2/1
THE TELMEX SAGA CONTINUES
last thirteen years. Part VI reviews the five incremental steps
the Mexican government has taken to liberalize the telecom in-
vestment industry. Part VII addresses investors' initial reac-
tions to Mexico's new attitude on FDI in telecommunications,
followed by a discussion of how the administration has failed to
control Telmex. Furthermore, Part VII discusses the U.S. gov-
ernment's efforts to protect American telecom companies, which
have invested enormous amounts of capital with the expecta-
tion that Mexico would enforce competition regulations. Part
VIII concludes the comment.
II. PRIVATIZATION: A POTENTIAL VEHICLE To IMPROVE
TELECOM CONDITIONS IN MEXICO
While the Mexican government attempted to support its
economy with nationalized industries for nearly half a century,
Mexican citizens suffered the consequences, particularly in the
telecommunications sector. Poor quality service or no service,
outrageous prices, and outdated technology were common char-
acteristics of the Mexican telecom industry prior to the 1990s.
Just as other Latin American countries liberalized their telecom
markets at this time (and experienced positive results including
significant capital influx), the Mexican government realized
that the solution to spark the stagnant economy generally, and
the telecommunications sector specifically, might include priva-
tizing Telmex, the sole underachieving telecom company serv-
ing - or failing to serve - the Mexican population and market.
The sale of Telmex would be recorded as the largest privatiza-
tion in Latin America.
A significant source of the force to privatize Telmex in 1989
stemmed from consumers at home and in professional settings
who realized that the state-owned enterprise failed to address
the needs of the public in either a prompt or efficient manner.2
In a country with a population of approximately ninety million
people, the underdevelopment in the industry resulted in aston-
ishing statistics on telephone use. In urban settings, there ex-
isted an average of just nine phones per one hundred people
(compared to fifty lines per one hundred people in the U.S.),
2 See Brent Lee Vannoy, Mexican Telecommunications: Privatization and
NAFTA Open the Door For U.S. Expansion Into Mexican Markets, 17 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 309, 314-15 (1994).
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whereas in rural settings, it was not uncommon for one phone
to be shared by more than one thousand people.3 Furthermore,
installation charges were nearly seven times greater than in the
U.S., and waiting periods for new lines could last up to two
years.4 Aside from the inconvenience of not being able to place
personal calls, the amount of forgone business opportunities
due to such abominable telecommunications conditions pre-
sumptively resulted in astronomical dollar figure losses.
With the exception of telephone workers and a small group
of commentators who opposed privatization, 5 public disapproval
with newly elected President Salinas' privatization initiative
was negligible. The nationalists who took some convincing in-
cluded Telmex employees who felt betrayed and at risk of losing
their jobs without the State acting as an industry security blan-
ket. However, Mr. Salinas eased Telmex employees' concerns
by making several promises when he personally announced the
decision to sell the company. During a speech in front of dis-
gruntled Telmex employees, Mr. Salinas promised: (1) that
telephone workers' labor rights would be respected; (2) that all
current employees would be able to keep their jobs; (3) that cur-
rent employees would be awarded shares of the newly priva-
tized company; (4) that the state would remain the 'rector' of
telecommunications; and (5) that the new controller of Telmex
would be a Mexican national. 6 Consequently, Mr. Salinas con-
vinced his listeners that these changes would not only dramati-
cally improve telephone service, but would also strengthen
scientific and technological research in the industry.7
By December of 1990, 55% of the majority voting rights in
Telmex had been sold to a partnership for $1.76 billion.8 How-
ever, the government retained 34% in limited voting rights, of
3 See Glover & Lotvedt, supra note 1, at 23.
4 See id. at 26.
5 Some anti-privatization arguments included: (1) the desire to retain profit
potential of telecommunication (an argument that refuses to consider long-term
benefits); (2) the yet to be concretely and credibly supported overbroad "essential
to the public good" argument; and (3) national security concerns. See Vannoy,
supra note 2, at 316-17.
6 See JUDITH CLITON, THE POLITICS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN MEXICO:
PRIVATIZATION AND STATE-LABOUR RELATIONS, 1982-1995, 150 (2000).
7 See id.
8 See William M. Berenson, Developing the Regulatory Footprint for Newly
Privatized Telecommunications Providers, 38 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 400, 400 (1991).
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which 4.4% was reserved for employees (Mr. Salinas made good
on one of the promises addressed above). Telmex was com-
pletely privatized in 1994 when Grupo Carso (a Mexican manu-
facturing and mining entity), SBC (formerly Southwestern Bell)
and France Telecom acquired the majority voting power of the
Mexican telecommunications giant. Grupo acquired a 10% in-
terest, while the latter two owners obtained a 5% interest each.9
The new consortium planned to spend a total of $13 billion to
make Telmex Latin America's top telecommunications
provider.10
Despite Mexico's official open-door policy to foreign invest-
ment in telecommunications, Telmex refused to follow new
telecom regulations, which were supposed to guarantee compet-
itors an equal opportunity to enter the market. Part of the
agreement to privatize Telmex included granting Telmex a mo-
nopoly on long-distance services until January 1, 1997, as well
as on local service until 2026.11
However, in exchange for granting Telmex a monopoly in
long distance and basic services, the government required the
company's new owners to launch "a massive revitalization pro-
gram for the nation's telecommunications system."12 Under this
agenda, the new owners were required to: "(1) install 500,000
new lines each year; (2) install telephones in 10,000 towns with
over 500 inhabitants; (3) quadruple the number of pay phones;
and 4) digitize to provide fiber optic links to the larger cities."13
In essence, the agreement required the new Telmex owners to
significantly upgrade consumer services and telecom infrastruc-
ture in exchange for receiving market advantages (i.e., via
"concessions").
III. HISTORY OF MEXICAN POLICY ON FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT (FDI)
Mexico has had a turbulent history with foreign direct
investment policies, which arguably came full circle when the
9 See ARIZONA OFFICE OF TRADE, TOURISM AND INVESTMENT, THE MEXICAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET (2000), available at www.natlaw@natlaw.com
[hereinafter ARIZONA OFFICE OF TRADE].
10 See Vannoy, supra note 2, at 317.
11 See id. at 320.
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government privatized several industries including Telmex,
and passed legislation which had the potential to significantly
reduce investment barriers in the 1990s. 14 This section ad-
dresses the history leading up to the government's decision to
make fundamental changes in Mexican investment policies by
reintroducing a more receptive attitude toward foreign direct
investment.
Long before Mexico's most recent efforts to address the
shortcomings that accompany an economy of nationalized in-
dustries, foreign investors were invited to freely enter the Mexi-
can markets nearly one hundred years ago. 15 The positive
economic implications of an open market economy during the
pre-1910 Mexican revolutionary period were impressive,
whereby passive economic control at the administrative level
resulted in significant economic growth. 16 However, about
twenty years of social and political instability followed as a con-
sequence of a newly developed nationalistic attitude in Mexico,
triggered by the introduction of the Mexican Constitution and
the National Revolutionary Party into government. 17 A combi-
nation of the Mexican revolution and the worldwide depression
in the 1930s resulted in the abandonment of Mexico's liberal
market model.' 8
In an effort to restructure the Mexican economy, the gov-
ernment focused almost exclusively on the internal promotion
of domestic industries.19 Shortly before the Second World War,
the government sent a milestone message to investors abroad
by nationalizing Mexico's number one economic jewel: the pe-
troleum industry. Additional measures to follow included im-
plementing constitutional and general law limitations on
foreign investment in mining, electric and nuclear power, bank-
14 See Foreign Investment Law (FIL), D.O., Dec. 27, 1993.
15 See Rafael X. Zahralddin, Venture Capital Opportunities and Mexican Tele-
communications After the passage of the NAFTA and the Ley De Inversion Ex-
tranjera, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 899, 903 (1995).
16 See id. In 1897, Mexico was the recipient of 31.5 % of all U.S. foreign invest-
ment. See also VAN R. WHITING, JR., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOREIGN INVEST-
MENT IN MEXICO 59, 61-62 (1992).
17 See Zahralddin, supra note 15, at 904.
18 See id. See also WHITING, supra note 16, at 100.
19 See Fernando Sanchez Ugarte, Mexico's New Foreign Investment Climate,
12 Hous. J. INT'L L. 243, 244 (1990).
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ing, transportation, and communications. 20 As these govern-
ment policies indicated a growing trend of hostility toward
foreign investment, former heavily investing countries like the
United States had no choice but to invest elsewhere.
Mexico's line of restrictions on foreign investment climaxed
in 1973 shortly after the government seized control of the tele-
phone industry2l with the passage of the Law to Promote Mexi-
can Investment and to Regulate Foreign Investment (LPMI).
At this time, scarcity of foreign investment, particularly from
the U.S., was at its peak.22 Though, arguendo, the government
may have had good intentions in passing the LPMI, the practi-
cal result was counterproductive to the development of the Mex-
ican economy. In essence, the new rules promulgated foreign
ownership restrictions in all industries. Furthermore, the gov-
ernment granted increased discretion and broad power to the
LPMI ministry, which - not surprisingly - led to cases of cor-
ruption. 23 In sum, the practical implications of the law "clearly
burdened new venture capital activities."24
The deterioration of Mexico's investment policies became
more evident in the 1970s and 1980s, as indicated in the tele-
communications industry. Extensive government regulation re-
sulted in basic inefficiencies in this sector. For example, by
keeping out foreign investors in Mexico, technology became
stagnant; leaving the industry to manage outdated and cost
inefficient systems without a realistic competitive future. Inept
government management resulted in concrete, and for devel-
oped country standards, preposterous shortcomings: by 1989,
fax machines were virtually non-existent, 20% of Mexico's
phones were out of service at one time, and waiting periods for
service could last longer than six months.25 In sum, if Mexico
wanted to develop into a modernized state in the world econ-
20 These drastic nationalization measures were authorized under Article 27 of
the new Mexican Constitution of 1917, which states in relevant part that "[tihe
Nation shall have at all times the right to impose on private property such modali-
ties as the public interest dictates, and the right to regulate the use and exploita-
tion of all natural resources susceptible to appropriation, in order to preserve, and
to effect equitable distribution of, the public wealth...." See MEX. CONST. art. 27.
21 See Vannoy, supra note 2, at 312.
22 See Zahralddin, supra note 15, at 907.
23 See id. See also WHITING, supra note 16, at 100.
24 Zahralddin, supra note 15, at 907. See also WHITING, supra note 16, at 100.
25 See Vannoy, supra note 2, at 312.
2002]
9
PACE INT'L L. REV.
omy, its bungling government would need to embrace signifi-
cant market-based reform.
Upon realization that its current policies lacked a globally
competitive industrial future, the Mexican government took its
first significant step toward improvement when President Sali-
nas passed an amendment to the LPMI in 1989: the Regula-
tions to the Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate
Foreign Investment (RLPMI). The new regulations marked a
modest change in Mexico's policy to limit foreign investment in
local industries.26 Most importantly, the following new mea-
sures sparked new confidence in foreign investors by limiting
the discretion of the foreign investment commission and setting
forth a predictable and transparent legal framework, which im-
posed several basic conditions on capital investment from
abroad. The new conditions required demonstrating inter alia:
(1) a need to obtain capital investments financed from abroad;
(2) the capacity to generate sufficient employment opportuni-
ties; and (3) the use of competitive technologies.2 7
Aside from codifying these requisites, the RLPMI ad-
dressed one of the most significant considerations of foreign in-
vestors who decide on whether to invest in a specific foreign
country: operational control of the enterprise.28 Formerly, ab-
sent very rarely granted permission by the Foreign Investment
Commission (FIC), the LPMI prohibited foreign investors from
holding a majority interest in a Mexican company. In turn, for-
eign investors were denied practical control of the enterprise.
Although the RLPMI improved these restrictions by allowing
up to 49% foreign ownership in certain industries of the Mexi-
can economy, the telecommunications sector was only moder-
ately affected by these rules because investors remained subject
to many LPMI restrictions. Consequently, in the telecommuni-
cations arena, the venture capital barriers remained. 29
26 See Zahralddin, supra note 15, at 912.
27 See id. at 910.
28 See id. at 913.
29 See id. at 915. See also Regulations to the Law to Promote Mexican Invest-
ment and Regulate Foreign Investment, art. 7 (1989) [hereinafter RLMPI].
[Vol. 14:211
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol14/iss2/1
THE TELMEX SAGA CONTINUES
IV. THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW OF 1993 (FIL) AND THE
NEW TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW OF 1995 (FTL): THE
INTRODUCTION OF A NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESS FOR
PENETRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT BARRIERS IN MEXICO
A. The FIL: General FDI Liberalizing Legislation
Following the dramatic changes in Mexican foreign invest-
ment policy (including the privatization of several vital indus-
tries), the government took additional steps to attract
investment capital in 1993 by passing the Ley de Inversion Ex-
tranjera (Foreign Investment Law), which repealed the LPMI of
1973.30 By passing the FIL, the government expected that a re-
duction in ownership percentage barriers, clearer guidelines on
petitions and registration requirements for investments, and
the existence of avenues to seek redress upon alleged violations
of the FIL would trigger foreign investor confidence. 31
The new law's objective was to provide an efficient set of
regulations that would attract foreign investment into Mexico
and ensure that such investments contribute to national devel-
opment. 32 The FIL mandates that for the first time, 100% di-
rect foreign ownership is permitted in those industry sectors
that are not specifically enumerated in the statute.33 Unfortu-
nately for foreign investors, the law sets specific percentage
ceilings in some sectors, including the telecommunications in-
dustry in which foreign ownership is capped at 49%.34 How-
ever, a significant exception to this rule provides for 100%
direct foreign ownership in cellular telephone service, provided
that the National Foreign Investment Commission (NFIC or
Commission) grants approval of such an application. 35
1. The Role of the NFIC
Petitions for investment are considered by the NFIC, a fin-
ger of the Mexican Executive Branch of Government. The NFIC
presents the first obstacle for investors to overcome in a foreign
30 See FIL, D.O., Dec. 27, 1993.
31 See David J. Drez, Direct Foreign Investment in Mexico's Telecommunica-
tions Market, 3 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. AM. 112, 117 (1997).
32 See FIL, D.O., Dec. 27, 1993, art. 1.
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investment endeavor. 36 With the underlying objective of maxi-
mizing the benefits to Mexico, the Commission considers sev-
eral principles in deciding whether to allow an investor to
penetrate the market. The following criteria are considered in
addition to already existing considerations set forth in the
RLPMI.37
First, the Commission determines what type of impact the
investment will have on employment and training. 38 The Mexi-
can government is concerned with creating new jobs for its citi-
zens, as well as the need to monitor the quality of those jobs.
For example, the Mexican government would prefer an investor
who promises to treat Mexican employees fairly with respect to
wages and working conditions. 39 Furthermore, this considera-
tion supplements the RLPMI codification, which focuses on cre-
ating jobs that are permanent and promote worker training.40
Second, an investor's promised introduction of technologi-
cal advantages would be viewed favorably by the Commission
and increase the investor's chance of entering the market.41
Particularly in the telecommunications industry, where out-
dated technology and resources are in desperate need of a surge
(which in some cases even pose health risks to the public),42 the
Commission views investors' newly developed information tech-
nology (IT) as a favorable element to accompany the
investment.
Third, the NFIC closely examines the effects an investment
might have on the environment. 43 For example, the Commis-
sion may be more reluctant to grant clearance to an energy
plant project that does not pass the environmental standards of
36 See id.
37 RLPMI considerations include that: (1) the NFIC will not clear investments
in fixed assets that exceed $100 million; (2) it is required that foreign capital fund
the investment; and (3) industrial projects are prohibited in the "Mexican Trian-
gle" consisting of Monterey, Mexico City and Guadalajara.
38 See Drez, supra note 31, at 119.
39 See id.
40 See Ramon H. Bravo, Mexican Legal Framework Applicable to Operations
Involving Financial Services, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1239, 1241 (1994).
41 See Drez, supra note 31, at 119.
42 Such risks may include rotted telephone poles or outdated and improperly
maintained machinery. Sometimes the means to repair machinery may simply not
be present in the country with respect to necessary parts or skills to maintain the
equipment properly.
43 See Drez, supra note 31, at 119.
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the investor's country. A red flag is presumably raised when
opportunistic investors attempt to introduce projects into a
country and negative environmental implications are not con-
sidered to be severe enough to preclude the project from materi-
alizing. In most cases, investors will simply have to pass
muster under the Mexican environmental standards.
Fourth, the FIL introduces a broad-spectrum requirement
for the NFIC to take into consideration the general contribution
of the investment to productivity in the country. 44 Essentially,
the NFIC reviews and assesses what overall benefits accom-
pany the investment with respect to Mexico's economy and the
public. For example, an investment in the telecommunications
sector that not only creates new quality jobs but also provides
technological advances and attracts large amounts of capital
into the country - most of which will stay within the borders
through re-investing - is likely to qualify as an investment
with sufficient positive effects in Mexico.
Finally, the FIL grants the Commission the discretion to
impose conditions on the foreign investment, "to the extent that
those conditions do not extort trade."45 This criterion is a
"catch-all" provision, which allows the Commission to balance
the "Mexican benefits scale" if the benefit to the Mexican econ-
omy and consumers is limited under the proposed investor's
agenda. For example, if the NFIC feels that the number of Mex-
ican employees expected to work on a project is too few in num-
ber and that the petition does not provide for sufficient quality
training of the employees, the Commission might set the follow-
ing condition for approval: a requirement of an increased speci-
fied number of Mexican employees, who must go through an
eight week training period at the investor's cost. Thus, the con-
dition requires the investor to make an additional "valuable"
contribution, in order to satisfy the Commission's expectations.
2. New Transparency Under the FIL
Aside from publicly submitting the above criteria taken
into consideration by the NFIC, the new FIL places concrete
limitations on the Commission, resulting in a benefit to inves-
tors who enjoy an increased sense of predictability upon their
44 See id.
45 FIL, D.O., Dec. 27, 1993, art. 29.
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application to invest in Mexico. 46 For example, upon receiving a
petition, the NFIC has a 45-day window to conclude that the
foreign investor's application passes or fails the above set crite-
ria.4 7 If the Commission fails to render a decision within the
time period, approval is automatic.48 Consequently, such a pro-
vision guarantees administrative efficiency for investors who
may be faced with time pressures, especially with respect to
products in a volatile market. For example, if the process for
receiving clearance for an investor in a new company lasted sev-
eral years, the company may have already become insolvent by
the time the NFIC approves the applicant. With this new time
limitation, however, the investor receives prompt notification of
whether to launch the project in Mexico or look elsewhere.
Additionally, a similar FIL time limitation is placed on the
Ministry of Trade and Industrial Development with respect to
decisions on whether to approve registration of a foreign com-
pany seeking operation in Mexico. 49 Under the new law, a for-
eign company, as well as all domestic companies with foreign
investor constituents doing business in Mexico, must register
with the National Registery of Foreign Investment and the Pub-
lic Registry of Commerce within forty days of formation. There-
upon, the Ministry of Trade has fifteen days to grant the
company's registration request. For reasons similar to those
stated in the previous paragraph, the time limit placed on the
Ministry is crucial to foreign investors who may be faced with
having to promptly seek alternate means of investment if it is
denied in Mexico at the incorporation stage.
Finally, the FIL provides for clear-cut recourse against for-
eign investors who fail to abide by the rules. For example, if
investors act contrary to, or without necessary NFIC approval,
the Ministry may impose sanctions against the foreign legal en-
tity.50 Rates of sanctions are set forth in the law, thereby pro-
viding foreign investors with constructive notice of potentially
46 See id.
47 See id. art. 28.
48 See id.
49 See FIL, D.O., Dec. 27, 1993, art. 32.
50 See id. art. 38(I).
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severe sanctions. 51 Aside from providing investors with trans-
parency in the sanction process, the FIL guarantees a degree of
due process following an alleged violation.52 Before sanctions
are imposed, investors are guaranteed a hearing during which
they may comment on the following criteria taken into consider-
ation by the Ministry: (1) nature of the violation; (2) seriousness
of the action; (3) ability of the offender to pay; (4) time of non-
compliance; and (5) total value of the transaction. 53
In sum, the FIL marks a significant departure from the
previous Mexican government approach of complete control by
removing "hosts of administrative and industrial restrictions on
foreign investment,"54 as well as some skepticism of foreign in-
vestors due to former unpredictability of the chance of approval.
Though some limitations within the FIL continue to exist (i.e.,
some sectors which the industry exclusively reserves to the
state, and foreign ownership percentage ceilings), the benefits
accompanying the new regulations weigh far heavier, as the
consequent influx in investment demonstrated.
By setting forth clear standards, considered by the NFIC,
and placing limitations on the Commission's discretion (most
importantly time limits), foreign investors became newly confi-
dent that Mexico provided a predictable, reliable and transpar-
ent investment process. Thus, the stage was set for continued
growth of benefits within the foreign investment market. The
FIL marked an important step in Mexico's overall reduction in
investment barriers and acted as a precursor to the novel tele-
communications law, which would be implemented two years
later.
B. The FTL: Liberalizing Telecom FDI Regulations
By acceding to NAFTA in 1994, the Mexican government
took another significant step to mandate transparency in the
foreign investment administrative process and committed to
open access of public telecommunication networks and services
51 In some instances, the question of whether to conform to or bend a rule
might simply be a business question in considering the cost of abiding by the law
compared to the risk of getting caught.
52 See FIL, D.O., Dec. 27, 1993, art. 38.
53 See id.
54 Zahralddin, supra note 15, at 918-19.
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on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.5 5 Moreover, the
government sent a strong message to foreign investors regard-
ing Mexico's commitment to attract capital in the global tele-
communications sector when it passed the Federal
Telecommunications Law on June 8, 1995 (FTL), which incorpo-
rated many of the regional trade agreement's principals into do-
mestic law. The objectives of the FTL are set forth in Article 7:
[To] promote an efficient development of telecommunications;
carry out the State control to this respect in order to guarantee
the national sovereignty; promote healthy competition among the
different renders of telecommunication services in order to pro-
mote better prices, diversity and quality of services in benefit of
the users; and promote an adequate social coverage (emphasis
added).
The most significant policy change compared to former leg-
islation was the goal of introducing competition and rules for
competition in both local and long distance services, as well as
in radio and satellite communications. 56 To help to attract
more investment, the FTL sets forth detailed ground rules for
granting concessions to telecommunications companies inter-
ested in competing in the newly deregulated market. 57
1. Establishing Agencies: The SCT and COFETE
In an effort to implement the deregulation and pro-competi-
tion process as effectively and efficiently as possible, the govern-
ment delegated authority to administrative bodies like the
Ministry of Communications and Transportation (Secretdria de
Communicaci6nes y Tranportes) (SCT or Ministry) to issue per-
mits and licenses to companies interested in entering the mar-
ket.58 However, the government failed to provide guidelines to
the SCT, thereby taking a significant risk in hopes that the
agency would succeed even without a transition period into a
competitive market from a system that had been dominated for
55 See Vannoy, supra note 2, at 323-26. While there are significant implica-
tions of Mexico's accession to NAFTA, a discussion of the regional agreement is
outside the scope of this comment. However, the basic principals of NAFTA are
similar to those set forth in the WTO Agreement discussed below.
56 See Drez, supra note 31,at 122.
57 See Federal Telecommunications Law (FTL), D.O. June 7, 1995, Chap. III.
58 See Drez, supra note 31,at 124.
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decades by a nationalized monopoly service provider.5 9 Not sur-
prisingly, the newly created agency was overwhelmed with the
expectation of introducing new telecommunications policy.60
To address the SCT's shortcomings, the government cre-
ated the Comision Federal De Telecommunicaciones (COFETE)
in August of 1996 to assist the SCT in regulating the telecom-
munications market.61 COFETE was made up of a four-mem-
ber panel headed by the former secretary of the SCT, Mr. Carlos
Cassasus Lopez. COFETE, charged with overseeing the tele-
phone, paging, cable TV, and wireless industries, operates as an
autonomous sub-sector within the SCT and is analogous to the
U.S. Federal Communications Commission.62
The Ministry was faced with the challenge of taking the lib-
eralized set of rules and implementing them in a structured,
transparent manner that would make Mexico's newly opened
market attractive to investors who were legitimately concerned
about the long history of investment barriers. The key was to
make the transition as smooth as possible and to ensure that
true competition in the market would indeed result.63 To
achieve this challenging goal, the Ministry would need to be
particularly cautious of the industry's giant, as Telmex would
be inclined to inhibit fair competition by using its dominant po-
sition to discriminate against new entrants.64 As one author
pointed out in 1996, if the Ministry was successful in promul-
gating a smooth transition, a new competitive regime "[would
offer] lower prices, higher service quality, broader consumer
choice, more efficient industries, higher productivity, and a
stimulus to economic growth, particularly in the information-
intensive service industries."65 In other words, absent variables
59 See Adrienne Hanley, Mexico's Commitment To Open Telecom Markets to
Competition 15-16 (1996), available at http://www.natlaw.com/database.
60 See id. at 16.
61 See Glover & Lotvedt, supra note 1, at 27. See also Communication: New
Phone Commission Created, 6 MEX. Bus. MONTHLY (Sept. 1, 1996).
62 See Glover & Lotvedt, supra note 1, at 27-28.
6 See Hanley, supra note 59, at 34-35, for a review of how best to achieve this
"smooth transition." Numerous suggestions have been made on how to implement
the transition; however, the novelty of the situation makes it difficult to predict
which method might be most effective in facilitating a market based on competi-
tive principles. Id.
64 See id. at 18-19.
65 Id. at 20.
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that impede free market access, the FTL sets the stage for
healthy trade in the Mexican telecommunications market.
2. Scope of the FTL
The FTL language is very broad, covering nearly every cor-
ner of the telecommunications industry.66 Aside from issues
raised by the inexperience of FTL implementers, the actual pro-
visions of the FTL include both foreign investment attractors
and deterrents. While theoretical shortcomings exist, the
codifications and the law's policy of ensuring access to telecom-
munications networks set a promising foundation for foreign di-
rect investment in Mexico. 67
a. Investment Deterrents: Lingering Limitations on FDI
On the one hand, possibly the least attractive criterion in-
volves the limitation placed on foreign ownership of companies
within Mexico. Placing a ceiling of 49% ownership in telecom-
munications, except for cellular telecommunications services
where 100% ownership is permitted, 68 raises investor concerns
about maintaining sufficient control over the company's day-to-
day activities and general decision-making power. Further-
more, the law provides that public telegraph and radiotelegraph
services are completely reserved to the state, and that invest-
ments in the radio spectrum are solely reserved to Mexican na-
tionals. 69 Thus, both partial and complete limitations raise
significant questions and impede investors' ambitions to engage
the Mexican telecommunications market.
b. Investment Facilitators: A Transparent Process
On the other hand, the law sets forth a number of guide-
lines available to foreign investors, which, similarly to the FIL,
lend transparency, predictability, and credibility to the invest-
ment process. For example, with respect to licenses, applica-
tions and permits, the FTL provides time limits before which
permission to conduct business must be granted or denied. The
SCT has 120 days to review a license application and ninety
66 See Drez, supra note 31, at 122.
67 See id. at 123.
68 See id.
69 See FTL, D.O., June 7, 1995, art. 9.
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days to review a request for a permit. 70 Furthermore, the law
provides that licenses are issued for a term of up to thirty years
and may be renewed provided certain time limits are complied
with under the renewal section. 71 Thus, these guidelines limit
the discretion of COFETE panel members and provide a sense
of reliability to investors who may be under time pressure to
decide whether to invest in the telecommunications market.
Furthermore, the FTL sets forth the specific obligations of
licensees. 72 The law mandates that under the separate satellite
communications provision, all licensees must respect Intellec-
tual Property Rights (IP). 73 The protection of IP is a serious
concern, particularly for developed countries like the United
States, which is host to a plethora of producers and creators of
art and technology, the substance of which easily could be
knocked-off in a less sophisticated market. Additionally, licen-
sees are required to properly register with the SCT before con-
ducting business, although they may freely establish rates. 74
Furthermore, not only may such rates not be applied discrimi-
natorily but also existing telecommunications assets available
to one licensee (i.e., transmissions towers and cables) must be
made available on equal terms to other licensees. 75 Thus, at
least in theory, foreign investors would feel confident to invest
in a market where domestic entities will not be treated differ-
ently from foreign owned entities.
Additionally, the FTL provides for transparency in the ad-
ministrative process by requiring that registration information
remain public (as opposed to legally confidential). 76 This sec-
tion complements the registration process set forth in the FIL,
although the FTL does not set forth specific time restrictions on
when companies must register.77
Finally, the FTL provides guidelines to foreign investors
with respect to compliance and sanctions. Companies are moni-
70 See id. arts. 25 and 32 (respectively).
71 See id. art. 27.
72 See generally id. art. 44.
73 See id.
74 See FTL, D.O., June 7, 1995, art. 61.
75 See id. art. 44(VI).
76 See Drez, supra note 31, at 129.
77 See FTL, D.O., June 7, 1995, arts. 64-65. See also Drez, supra note 31, at
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tored by and must cooperate with requests for compliance inves-
tigations by the SCT.78 Investigations of license and permit
holders for compliance with FTL provisions include on-site in-
spections of facilities and books. Accrued costs for such inspec-
tions are borne by the parties themselves. 79 Additionally, the
law sets forth guidelines for sanctions and penalties if a com-
pany defies regulations.80 Potential violations surface when
companies conduct business without valid licenses or permits,
fail to keep the proper books, or illegally intercept transmitted
information via public networks. Penalties for these types of vi-
olations range from 2000 to 100,000 wages"' and are subject to
doubling in repeat offender cases. In extreme violations, the
SCT is granted the authority to seize property, facilities, and
equipment used in violating the law.8 2
V. MEXICO's ACCESSION TO THE WTO: AN ADDITIONAL LAYER
OF SECURITY FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS IN MEXICO
Aside from implementing new transparent procedural rules
for foreign direct investors, which allowed investors to consider
Mexico as a far more attractive candidate for investment in the
telecommunications industry, Mexico's commitment to the
WTO further encouraged foreign investors to allow more capital
to flow into the Mexican market. Several key understandings
under the WTO agreement (i.e., the Dispute Settlement Under-
standing (DSU)) provide additional security to foreign inves-
tors, particularly with respect to the remarkable increase in the
trade of telecommunications equipment.
A. The Trade Industry
The U.S. export of telecommunications equipment to Mex-
ico has grown exponentially since Mexico opened its markets.
While equipment exports fluctuated in numbers between 1990
($563 million) and 1995 ($733 million), the amount of U.S. dol-
78 See FTL, D.O., June 7, 1995, art. 67.
79 See id.
80 See id. art 71.
81 Under the FIL "Wages" are defined as the minimum daily wages in effect at
the time of the violation. The minimum wage in Mexico following the implementa-
tion of the FTL was approximately U.S. $12 per month, based on a six day, 48-hour
work-week. See FIL D.O., Dec. 27, 1993, art. 38.
82 See FTL, D.O., June 7, 1995, art. 72. See also Drez, supra note 31, at 130.
230 [Vol. 14:211
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol14/iss2/1
THE TELMEX SAGA CONTINUES
lars invested into exports increased exponentially between 1996
(over $1 billion) and 2000 (over $2.5 billion).83 Factors contrib-
uting to this dramatic growth in telecommunications trade with
Mexico are manifold. Aside from the geographic advantage of
sharing a two thousand mile border, a growing population clos-
ing in on one hundred million people, a GDP of $581 billion, and
the overhaul of the Mexican Telecommunications Administra-
tion served as a foundation to promote a thriving trade relation-
ship.8 4 In order to lend credibility to the new laws and policies,
the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures,
which relates only to goods, spells out that the administration is
to consider foreign trade applications fairly and in a non-dis-
criminatory fashion under the concept of "national treatment,"
provided for under Article III of the GATT. In relevant part,
Article III.4 provides:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported
into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products
of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and require-
ments affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use.85
In light of the implications of Mexico's accession to the
WTO (i.e., indicating that Mexico stands behind its liberalized
policies), an optimistic U.S. Commercial Service in Mexico pre-
dicted that Mexico would become the number one trading part-
ner of the U.S. by 2005.86
B. The Investment Industry
By signing the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunica-
tions Services, Mexico "committed to market access and na-
tional treatment for all services (except satellite-based services)
by January 1, 1998... [and] adopted the Reference Paper to the
Agreement, a consensus document based upon pro-competitive
83 See Janette Stevens, Telecommunications in Mexico, EXPORT AMERICA,
March 2001, at 23.
84 See Stevens, supra note 83, at 23.
85 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), National Treatment on
Internal Taxation and Regulation, pt.2, at art. 3 § 4 (1947).
86 See Stevens, supra note 83, at 23. Currently, the U.S.' premier trading
partner is Canada, with Mexico and Japan close behind.
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regulatory principles."87 In its application to the current situa-
tion in Mexico, the crucial concept of "national treatment"
stands for Mexico's commitment not to treat foreign investors
any less favorably than its domestic counterparts in the compet-
ing companies' industries.
In other words, Mexican officials are prohibited from grant-
ing a domestic corporation like Telmex an advantage, with re-
spect to basic telecom services, over a foreign company like
AT&T or GTE. Apart from committing to prevent anti-competi-
tive practices within the industry, signatory countries like Mex-
ico guarantee that "the regulatory body is separate from, and
not accountable to, any supplier of basic telecommunications
services. The decisions of, and the procedures used by regula-
tors, shall be impartial with respect to all market
participants. "88
Furthermore, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures (TRIMS) manifests additional assurance with respect
to the signatory country's commitment to the practice of non-
discriminatory treatment of foreign investors.8 9 The TRIMS ob-
jective is "to promote the expansion and progressive liberaliza-
tion of world trade and to facilitate investment across
international frontiers so as to increase the economic growth of
all trading partners ... while ensuring free competition."90 Not
surprisingly, the unprecedented amount of capital introduced
into the market resulted in an expected significant increase in
the amount of trade in U.S. telecom equipment. Since un-
hindered competition is at the heart of this agreement's agenda,
and the WTO agreement provides no exception for Mexico, U.S.
equipment shall be allowed to freely penetrate the Mexican
equipment market without being subject to unfair advantages
87 Id. at 24 (emphasis added). A group of over twenty-five countries made
commitments to this Basic Telecommunications Agreement in 1998, including
Mexico and the United States. See The WTO Agreement: A Country-By-Country
Guide to Commitments, TELECOMM. REP. INT'L (Kelley, Drye & Warren L.L.P), Oct.
1998.
88 U.S. Department of Commerce ITA Office of Telecommunications Technolo-
gies, WTO Basic Telecommunications Services Agreement Reference Paper, availa-
ble at http://www.telecom.ita.doc.gov/ot.home.nsf/504ea249c786e20f8525628400
6da7ab/362d52.
89 See The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, available at
http.www.wto.org/English/docs-e/legal-e/18-trimse.htm.
90 Id. (emphasis added).
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granted to domestic manufacturers. As a result of Mexico's new
commitments, it was estimated that the practical implications
of this newly liberalized scheme along with the favorable geo-
graphic situation would result in a combined telecommunica-
tions market for equipment and services in Mexico of over $3.5
billion annually.9 1
VI. A REVIEW OF MEXICO'S FIVE INCREMENTAL STEPS TOWARD
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION
The Mexican government's incremental movement toward
a free investment market (marked by (1) the privatization pro-
cess, (2) the adoption of a newly deregulated administrative
process, and (3) the accession to NAFTA and the WTO) sets the
stage for an influx of foreign investment, particularly in the
telecommunications market. This comment has addressed five
significant steps taken by the Mexican government over the last
thirteen years.
First, through the initial liberalization vehicle of the 1989
RLMPI, the Mexican administration started to raise interna-
tional investor interest, especially by: (1) limiting the discretion
of the foreign investment administration; (2) formulating a tan-
gible framework for foreign investors; and (3) opening the door
to foreign control in Mexican markets.
Second, foreign investors became increasingly interested in
Mexican FDI development when Mexico took its next step to-
ward liberalization via the privatization process. Foreign inves-
tors were encouraged by the Mexican government's decision to
take the drastic step of de-nationalizing major industries. A
particularly strong message was sent to telecommunications en-
trepreneurs when Telmex, the backbone of Mexico's telecommu-
nications industry, was privatized in 1990.
Third, the administration's next step to attract foreign in-
vestment included providing a legislative foundation to comple-
ment its new policies by implementing the FIL in 1993.
Through the new law, the administration provided clearer
guidelines for petitioners in several areas, including adminis-
trative considerations on allowing investment, placing time lim-
its on bureaucratic activities, and providing for avenues of
91 See Stevens, supra note 83, at 23.
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redress (i.e., due process) for investors who felt that they were
treated inappropriately in the process.
Fourth, a healthy step toward liberalizing the telecommu-
nications market was marked by the implementation of the
FTL in 1995. Through this new law, which closely paralleled
the objectives of the FIL on an industry specific level, the con-
cept of competition was finally introduced into a market that
had been dominated by the Telmex monopoly for nearly half a
century. However, despite promising legislative changes, the
issue remained of how effectively the new legislative bodies (i.e.,
COFETE) would be able to reintroduce the free market concept,
if at all.
Finally, by becoming a signatory to the largest multilateral
agreement, the Mexican government inherently promised fair
play within the telecom trade and investment industry, which
foreign investors viewed as further assurance that foreign capi-
tal was safe within Mexican borders. Since the DSU provides
an effective forum for the settlement of disputes, foreign inves-
tors felt confident that "Big Brother" in Geneva would be watch-
ing and willing to intervene if Mexican officials discriminated
against foreign companies. Since foreign direct investors, ar-
guably, had recourse in domestic and international fora, it
seemed even more reasonable to invest in Mexico.
VII. MEXICO IS OPEN FOR BUSINESS ... OR IS IT?
A. Early Reaction to Mexico's New Telecommunications
Liberalization
The reaction of U.S. foreign investors to Mexico's progres-
sive changes in telecommunications legislation and new inter-
national commitments was daring. The Mexican developments
had set the stage for a predictable, transparent, and reliable
foreign investment-friendly arena. Consequently, shortly
before the market was officially liberalized in the basic commu-
nications industry (i.e., up to 49% foreign ownership), several of
the major U.S. telecommunications companies conducted exten-
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1. The New U.S. Constituent Market Entrants
The major companies in the telecom market included: (1)
Telmex/SBC International/France Telecomm; (2) Telmex/
Sprint, Avantel, S.A.; (3) Alestra-Unicom; (4) Iusatel; (5) Mar-
catel, S.A.; and (6) Investcom, S.A., all of which received li-
censes to compete around the time that the FTL was passed in
1995.92
The privatization of Telmex in 1990, by which SBC Interna-
tional and France Telecom purchased 10% and 5% respec-
tively,93  resulted in some progress in the telecom
infrastructure. Improvements included connecting fifty four of
Mexico's largest cities by laying nearly 15,000 kilometers of fi-
ber optic cable and adding nearly 3.3 million new phone lines,
as well as installing over 120,000 new public phones. 94 The two
foreign constituents invested over $10 billion as part of the
agreement.95
The Telmex/Sprint alliance was established in 1995 and fo-
cused on cross-border services with corporate, consumer, and
carrier markets, mainly to the U.S. and Canada.96 This joint
venture addressed cross border marketing ambitions, joint tech-
nology transfer, and IP licensing. A significant consumer target
of the venture was to offer telecommunications services to His-
panics in the U.S.97 Ironically, 98 part of the agreement required
that Sprint would not enter as a competitor in the long distance
market.99 However, the Telmex/Sprint joint venture only lasted
until May of 1999, when Telmex bought Sprint's shares in the
company. The companies' impasse resulted from conflicting
goals because Telmex wanted to expand the venture's scope into
92 See Glover & Lotvedt, supra note 1, at 30.
93 See ARIZONA OFFICE OF TRADE, supra note 9, at 7. The Telmex-Sprint Con-
sortium began proving basic telephone services to consumers in Mexico and the
U.S. in 1996. Id.
94 See id.
95 See id.
96 See Hanley, supra note 59, at 42.
97 See Telmex, Sprint Joint Venture Falls Apart (May 5, 1999), at http://www.
idg.net/ec?external=l&content sourceid=200remoteaddr=&docid=73637.
98 "Ironic" because Telmex was indirectly inhibiting competition by including
this "anti-competition clause" in its agreement with its partner.
99 See Telmex, Sprint Venture Falls Apart, supra note 97.
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areas such as money orders, an ambition Sprint was not willing
to pursue. 100
Avantel, S.A. is a joint venture made up of MCI Communi-
cations Corporation and Banacci (Grupo Financiero Banamex-
Accival), which began providing services in 1996,101 as one of
the earliest companies to compete with Telmex. Avantel's un-
derlying goal was to construct a sophisticated fiber optic cable
network to connect Mexico's "Triangle" cities (Mexico City, Gua-
dalajara and Monterey), and to specifically address business
and government consumer needs of long-distance services. 10
2
Aside from being an early entrant into the market, this venture
held an advantage over other competitors because Banamex al-
ready held Mexico's largest private telephone network in 1995,
which it leased to public and private firms in Mexico. 10 3 In Sep-
tember of 1995, Avantel proposed an investment of $1.8
billion.104
The next largest U.S. constituent joint venture, named
Alestra, was made up of AT&T and Alfa Telecom (a Mexican
consortium of industrial companies), which later merged with
Unicom (made up of a joint venture including U.S. constituent
GTE). Rather than focusing on a particular telecom specialty,
this new venture provided a wide range of communications ser-
vices in Mexico. The double U.S. constituent make-up of the
company set the stage for increased competitive strengths to
counter Telmex. Alestra's joint venture investment proposal to-
taled over $1 billion.' 0 5
The third largest joint venture entered into between U.S.
and Mexican company constituents was called lusatel. This al-
liance consisted of a 42% stake held by Bell Atlantic and a Chil-
ean long-distance carrier controlled by Grupo Iusacell, S.A. (one
of Mexico's largest telecommunications operators). 10 6 Though
100 See id. (According to Sprint executives reporting to the Wall Street
Journal.)
101 Avantel's license was granted on September 15, 1995. See Bjorn Wellenius
& Gregory Staple, Beyond Privatization: The Second Wave of Telecommunications
Reforms in Mexico, The World Bank Discussion Papers # 341, 17 (Nov. 1996),
available at http://www.worldbank.org.
102 See ARIZONA OFFICE OF TRADE, supra note 9, at 8.
103 See id.
104 See Wellenius and Staple, supra note 101, at 17.
105 See id.
106 See Glover & Lotvedt, supra note 1, at 33.
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this partnership initially entered the market to provide local
and long-distance services, Bell Atlantic desired to gain a foot-
hold in the Mexican wireless services market as well. Following
an initial block of the idea by Mexican officials (resulting in for-
eign concerns about how "open" the Mexican telecommunica-
tions market really was), the government agreed in 1996 to let
lusatel engage the wireless market in less populated areas as
part of a five year plan to extend services to Mexico's rural ar-
eas. This partnership's proposed investment was $808.7
million.107
Though there were some non-U.S. constituent companies,
which took advantage of the opportunity to enter the new Mexi-
can telecommunications market, their proposed investments
were relatively minor compared to those partnerships with U.S.
constituents. Such companies included Marcatel S.A. ($485
million investment), Investcom S.A. ($433.6 million invest-
ment), Unicorn Telecommunicaciones S. de R.L. ($340.2 million
investment), and Cableados y Sistemas S.A. ($155.6 million in-
vestment).108 Nevertheless, these joint ventures - particularly
in the aggregate - provided the industry with additional doses
of competition, regardless of their relatively minor individual
substantive impact on the market. 10 9 Thus, the fact that astro-
nomical amounts of money flowed into Mexico provided addi-
tional evidence that the government had been successful in its
goal of attracting foreign capital into Mexico.
The six new partnerships' ambitious investment decisions
represented the overall attitude of foreign investors who saw
Mexico's significantly deregulated administrative reforms as an
invitation to compete in a healthy industrial market. This surge
in joint ventures made quid pro quo business sense by present-
ing a mutually beneficial opportunity to U.S. constituents de-
spite the minority limitation on foreign ownership. While
Mexican companies could make use of extensive capital and
newer technological standards, U.S. investors gained valuable
insight into the local telecommunications industry and "[devel-
107 See Wellenius and Staple, supra note 101, at 17.
108 See id.
109 Although multi-million dollar investments are ordinarily not considered
minor, when comparing the capital numbers to some of the U.S. company num-
bers, there is a significant difference.
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oped] a relationship with local suppliers [without] running afoul
of the investment restrictions that still exist for foreign inves-
tors in Mexico." 110 Furthermore, with Mexico's liberalized poli-
cies now in place, the boards of directors of U.S. constituent
companies were confident that the risks of floating significant
amounts of company capital were outweighed by the potential
return in this very green, yet promising market.1"
Great potential returns were expected in the telecommuni-
cations market, since the need for foreign investment in this
Mexican industry ran the gamut from desperately needed basic
introduction of telecommunications in most areas to the need
for significant technology upgrade in those industrial areas
where phone lines already existed, but business opportunities
were stymied due to outdated equipment and a lack of efficient
services. Thus, billions of dollars of foreign capital flowed into
the Mexican telecommunications industry following the imple-
mentation of the FTL and Mexico's accession to the WTO.
B. Practical Realizations
1. Thwarted Investor Expectations
Although the Mexican administration laid a promising
foundation with respect to liberalizing its telecommunications
market, foreign investors have not been able to "come to Mexico
simply to sip on [m]argaritas along the Pacific coastline,"112
without serious concern about the kind of treatment new mar-
ket entrants actually receive. 11 3 It is one thing to set a trans-
parent domestic and international legal framework for foreign
investors, effectively implementing it is another. After the ini-
tial reaction of unprecedented influx of foreign capital into Mex-
ico, concerns quickly surfaced with respect to how open the
Mexican market actually was to companies that were looking
for a fair opportunity to compete in the market.
110 Glover & Lotvedt, supra note 1, at 31.
111 See id.
112 Camila Castellanos, Foreign Interest: Mexico has Become a Major Player in
the International Business Community, Mexico Connect, available at http://www.
mexicoconnect.com/mex-/travelbzm/bzmtop50-99.html.
113 See id. (Telmex continues to act like a protectionist; U.S. companies are
being treated unfairly; and COFETE is not changing the regulations fast enough
to open the sector to fair trade.)
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Investor concerns focused on Telmex, the now privatized
Mexican telecommunications giant. According to the govern-
ment's new regulatory changes, Telmex would have to sacrifice
its monopoly when the markets were opened. However, given
the kind and extent of concessions granted to Telmex by the
Mexican administration to facilitate the transition into an open
market (i.e., exclusivity rights guarantees), competition is still
hindered in the Mexican telecommunications industry today.
COFETE has simply been unable to administer the newly im-
plemented FTL in a pro-competitive manner, thus leaving in-
ternational competitors at a disadvantage. Consequently, it is
argued that Mexican authorities still need to make significant
changes to its administrative process, particularly with respect
to its treatment of Telmex, in order to realize benefits to con-
sumers that true competition introduces to a market.
2. COFETE's Failure to Enforce Regulations in Accordance
with the FTL and WTO
Hopes of foreign competitors ran high following Mexico's
promised opening of the telecommunications market. With the
new COFETE assigned to regulate the industry under the su-
pervision of the SCT, expectations soared along with the capital
flow into Mexico. However, the newly displayed confidence was
premature, as it quickly became obvious that COFETE would
be unable to control Telmex.
a. Interconnection Rates
U.S. constituent companies and U.S. consumers became
skeptical of the Mexican so-called competitive environment
when companies' rights to enter the market on a fair playing
field were undermined by unreasonable concessions COFETE
enforced on behalf of Telmex. 114 As a part of the new FTL, the
government granted Telmex the right to retain full control over
the complete telecommunications network through 1996.115 As
the sole licensed supplier of full services, the owner of the public
exchanges and the nationwide network of local telephone lines
(including long distance transmission facilities), Telmex held
114 See generally Glover & Lotvedt, supra note 1.
115 See id. at 28.
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the unchallenged status of telecommunications king.116 How-
ever, the provisions of the new Act required Telmex to realize
competition on January 1, 1997, by granting interconnection ac-
cess to sidelined companies. 117 Interconnection provides alter-
nate carriers in the market an opportunity to enter the
telecommunications infrastructure by allowing multiple carri-
ers' networks to interface.118 The law, specifically, provides
that upon request of a new concession holder, a public telecom-
munications network (i.e., Telmex) must provide interconnec-
tion within sixty days of the request.1 9 If carriers are unable to
come to an interconnection agreement, the SCT, which must ap-
prove all agreements, is required to set the terms and condi-
tions of interconnection rates. 120
Unfortunately, after the January 1, 1997, deadline passed,
COFETE failed to enforce the rules obligating Telmex to re-
move the barriers to competition. For example, although
Telmex was supposed to allow competitors to hook into the cen-
tral switching network and basic infrastructure through use of
existing lines (as opposed to forcing competitors to construct
new lines), the terms of interconnection agreements were un-
duly influenced by Telmex in such a way that they practically
block competitors' reasonable entrances into the market.121
Since the rates charged for interconnection service directly af-
fect the cost of providing service (and consequently affect the
amount end-users will need to be charged for entrants to sur-
vive in the market), unreasonably high interconnection fees
kept new companies out of the market. 122 In some cases,
Telmex even went as far as to completely refuse to lease private
line space to competitors, leaving disappointed U.S. companies
no choice but to seek recourse in domestic and international le-
gal fora in light of Telmex's blatant defiance of the rule. 123
116 See Hanley, supra note 59, at 49.
117 See id. at 48.
118 See id.
119 See FTL, D.O., June 7, 1995, art. 42.
120 See id. art. 43.
121 See generally Letter from Michael G. Oxley, Congressman, Fourth Ohio
District, to Ambassador Charlene Barchefsky, United States Trade Representative
(Mar. 10, 2000), available at www.house.gov/oxley/sOO03c.htm.
122 See id.
123 See, e.g., U.S. Department of State International Information Programs,
Text: U.S. to Request WTO Consultations with Mexico on Telecommunications
[Vol. 14:211
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol14/iss2/1
THE TELMEX SAGA CONTINUES
Although one might argue that COFETE and the SCT were
in place to ensure that such behavior (i.e., contracting on an un-
even playing field) would be contravened, the reality remains
that Telmex exercises its influence over COFETE to achieve
favorable decisions. Not only has Telmex been wreaking havoc
in Mexican courts since its privatization in 1990 by protesting
the new FTL rules COFETE is supposedly enforcing against it,
but a senior writer for eCountries.com for Latin American coun-
tries points out that "if Telmex is not happy,... the [Mexican]
Supreme Court can override any decision made by COFETE."124
In other words, if Telmex feels unfavorably treated by a
COFETE decision, Telmex can "use its resources" to meet its
goals in a superior forum, regardless of the kind of anti-compet-
itive practical result such actions may have on the market.
The negative implications of Telmex's continued monopolis-
tic behavior regarding the high interconnection fee issue affects
not only investor decisions but also consumers as well, particu-
larly in the U.S. Mexican-American community of over twenty
million people, which found itself paying more to place a call to
Mexico than to most places in Brazil.125 While Mexican con-
sumers pay nearly four times as much as U.S. consumers for
telecommunications services, 126 U.S. consumers were feeling
the effects at home too. At $.046 per minute, Telmex's intercon-
nection rate for connecting long distance carriers to Telmex cus-
tomers is by far the highest cost for competitive long distance
carriers compared to rates for calls to farther away countries. 127
Although $.046 per minute may not appear like a particularly
significant amount, when taking into consideration the aggre-
gate of three billion minutes of calls from the U.S. to Mexico per
year, 128 these statistics result in an egregiously deep reach into
(July 28, 2000), available at http://www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/trade/
wto2htm.
124 Michelle Gabrielle, Taming a Bully: U.S. Companies Tackle Mexican Tele-
communications Market, CFO (Nov. 28, 2000), available at http://www.cfo.com/
printarticle/1,4580,0/83/AD/1240,00.html.
125 See Letter from Michael G. Oxley, supra note 121.
126 See Trade Officials, Telmex Cutting U.S. Competition, 2 (July 30, 2000), at
http://www.adti.net.html-files/thirdparty/sundaycapital-tradeofficials073000.
html.
127 Rates in the United States, Canada and Chile are about $.005 per minute.
See U.S. Department of State International Information Programs, supra note 123.
128 See Trade Officials, supra note 126, at 1.
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U.S. consumer pockets. Furthermore, U.S. carriers continue to
face competition-diminishing rates for the transport of calls to
Mexican regions where they have not yet established their own
networks. 129
b. Termination Rates
Aside from charging interconnection fees, which allow U.S.
carriers access to Telmex's customer pool, 130 Telmex and sev-
eral other Mexican companies collect a "termination rate" each
time U.S. callers complete phone calls to Mexico. Due to Mex-
ico's outmoded system, this additional cost burdens competitors
and consumers alike because they are forced to pay higher
prices for access and service. The rate that was negotiated be-
tween government officials in 1999 for calls from the U.S. to
Mexico included a $.19 above-cost termination rate. 131 Com-
pared to the $.06 rate for calls to Canada and the United King-
dom, this gross disparity leaves consumers in the U.S. suffering
significant monetary consequences. Due to Telmex's continued
monopolistic behavior regarding the termination rate, U.S. car-
riers are having a difficult time entering the market on a level
playing field, thereby finding their chances of prospering or
even surviving in the market significantly undermined.
3. Seeking Recourse in the WTO
COFETE's failure to contain Telmex climaxed on Novem-
ber 8, 2000, when U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Charlene
Barshefsky requested a panel at the WTO to address U.S. con-
cerns about Mexico's failure to comply with WTO telecommuni-
cations obligations. 132 In particular, the complaint alleged that
Mexico had failed to ensure "timely, non-discriminatory inter-
connection for local competitors, cost-oriented interconnection
calls into and within Mexico, including calls to remote regions
where competitive suppliers lack facilities, and competitive al-
129 See U.S. Department of State International Information Programs, supra
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ternatives for terminating international calls into Mexico, cur-
rently set [disproportionate rates] ."133
The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding offers the
U.S. an effective forum to address these concerns, as significant
trade sanctions may be imposed if Mexico is found to be in viola-
tion of its commitments.134 Despite repeated promises by the
Mexican government to address its competition barriers, 35 Ms.
Barshefsky's continued attempts to settle the matter during
consultations with then President Zedillo failed. Consequently,
the U.S. sought WTO recourse.
The decision to bring a claim against Mexico resulted not
only from pressures of U.S. potential competitors who continued
to be sidelined due to anti-competitive entrance conditions but
also from existing competitors as well. For example, AT&T's
(Alestra's) general counsel pointed out that since Mexico contin-
ues "to impede low-cost cross border traffic, lacks cost-based
rates for interconnection to Telmex's network, and has not im-
plemented an effective pro-competitive regulatory regime,"1 36
Mexico will lack the means to realize the IT revolution. Accord-
ing to another AT&T spokesperson, the current circumstances
"[make] it almost economically impossible, for new companies
especially, to get in and compete in the [Mexican] telecom mar-
ket.1 37 MCI Worldcom (Avantel), the other major non-Mexican
constituent company, further supported USTR action 38 and
warned that continued failure to implement competition would
result in thwarting the growth of the internet and digital
revolution in Mexico.139 According to the president of
Worldcom Ventures and Alliances, the company is "hopeful that
this [WTOI action will lead to a predictable and equitable com-
petitive playing field, delivering the full benefits of competition
to Mexican consumers and businesses. 1 40
133 Gabrielle, supra note 124, at 1.
134 See generally GATT, arts. XXII & XXIII.
135 See U.S. Department of State International Information Programs, supra
note 123, at 1-2.
136 See Trade Officials, supra note 126, at 2.
137 Gabrielle, supra note 124, at 3.
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At the top of a list of concerns forwarded to the WTO, the
USTR emphasized COFETE's failure to discipline the dominant
carrier. 141 While WTO obligations require Mexico to prevent a
major supplier from engaging in anti-competitive practices, no
effective measures have been implemented to stop Telmex from
inhibiting U.S. competitors' attempts to enter the market, who
have proposed to offer services via interconnection or by build-
ing alternate local networks. 142 According to the USTR, "to
date, the Mexican government has not introduced effective mea-
sures to prevent Telmex from denying competitors phone lines,
pricing services at predatory rates, refusing to interconnect,
and refusing to pay competitors fees it owes them."1 43 Aside
from Mexico's failure to reign in the insolent Telmex, the U.S.
complaint addressed the issues of outrageously high intercon-
nection and termination rates, which were significantly dispro-
portionate to comparable rates charged for calls to other Latin
American countries. 144
a. Mexico's Reaction to U.S. Allegations
While complaints about Telmex's anti-competitive behavior
in the Mexican Telecommunications industry increased, the cre-
ativity of Jorge Nicolin (President of COFETE) and Carlos Slim
(Chairman of Telmex) also increased in defending the allega-
tions. According to Nicolin, Mexico was fulfilling all of its com-
mitments under the WTO as it was preparing to implement new
regulations that would supposedly reduce Telmex's domi-
nance. 145 However, the U.S. remained skeptical and continued
to move forward with the WTO complaint, as international in-
vestors were experiencing first hand that rules do not carry
weight if they are not effectively enforced.
Telmex set forth an array of arguments to counter allega-
tions that it was unfairly treating competitors in the market
and keeping potential competitors out. Astoundingly, Telmex
representatives claimed that it was their company that was un-





145 See Trade Officials, supra note 126, at 1.
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fairly discriminated against under the newly implemented FTL.
First, Telmex argued that the new rules required the company
to implement a price floor, thereby limiting its ability to pass
along savings to consumers. 146 Second, Telmex claimed that
the regulations, which require Telmex to be responsible to other
license holders for tariffs associated with billing and collection,
as well as emergency and operator calls, would result in an un-
fair advantage to competitors because Telmex would have to
provide services to them below cost. 147 Third, Telmex argued
that its ability to grow globally was severely hindered by the
new rules.148 Consequently, the company argued that the new
measures subjected Telmex to the risk of suffering significant
monetary losses. 149 In an interview in June of 2000, Mr. Slim
attacked U.S. long-distance competitors for supporting USTR
action: "Instead of going to the market, they go to the govern-
ment. I think they have more lawyers than engineers. We
worry about the quality of our service, our infrastructure and
our market position."150
The reality, however, is quite to the contrary. First, though
it is understandable that Telmex would oppose the new rules,
and - specifically - the implementation of a price floor, the
company incorrectly concluded that consumers would suffer an
increase in prices. This short-term closed-minded view
ridicules the underlying theory behind competition, which
through an increase in competitors and subsequent efforts to
entice consumers to change carriers, actually lowers prices.
Telmex's claim that it will have to raise its price is unfounded
because if Telmex did so in a truly free market, customers with
an actual choice would chose a competitor offering a lower price.
Hence, by providing the price floor, the Ministry was acting in
the consumers' best interests.
Second, Telmex's argument that the rules requiring the
company to provide certain tariffs to other license holders favor
new entrants and force the company to provide services to com-
petitors below its costs also lacks substance in light of the Min-




150 Trade Officials, supra note 126, at 2.
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istry's need to bring Mexico into compliance with WTO
regulations. While it is true that there is a likelihood that
Telmex may lose some customers, market share, and profitabil-
ity, the "affirmative action" type mechanism introduced as a
measure to breakup the monopoly necessarily requires a reduc-
tion in power and control enjoyed by the monopolist. Thus, in
order to directly address the source of the problem, Telmex
must realize and be willing to accept competitors' increases in
customers, market share and profitability. Furthermore, the
company's argument is largely unsubstantiated in light of the
fact that Telmex's total revenues reached $2.8 billion in just the
first quarter of 2000, an increase of 23.7% compared to the same
period in 1999.151 In light of the empirical data, it is clear that
COFETE has either failed to enforce the rules that shift a part
of the market's benefits to competitors, or its efforts have sim-
ply not resulted in the expected effect to de-throne Telmex.
Third, the argument regarding Telmex's alleged inability to
grow globally also lacks merit. Since the introduction of the
new rules, Telmex has moved in the exact opposite direction by
expanding its operations three-fold: domestically, north and
south of the border. Domestically, Telmex continues to expand
not only with its basic telecommunications network but also its
cellular subsidiary (Telcel) as well. According to Telmex CFO
Adolfo Cerezo, new cellular customers are being added daily
with a customer base near 6.5 million. 152 Additionally, Telmex
successfully penetrated the southern market. For example,
Telmex has been rapidly expanding and modernizing the tele-
communications infrastructure in Guatemala. 153  Finally,
Telmex has enjoyed success in the U.S. via the company's recent
admittance as a publicly traded company on the NYSE.
Telmex's expansion into the U.S. is particularly controversial
for U.S. competitors because the FCC treats Telmex equally to
other competitors in the U.S. (i.e., Telmex enjoys national treat-
ment within the U.S. as provided for under the WTO), while
COFETE continues to grant American telecommunications
companies less favorable treatment than it provides its home
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telecommunications giant. 54 In sum, Telmex is expanding its
operations in all directions.155
Despite Telmex's protectionist arguments both in courts
and in the press, the fact remains that the company continues
to impose its big stick policy on competitors and COFETE, and
will continue to do so until meaningful measures are introduced
to check the monopoly. While COFETE claims that Mexico's
telecom market is open for business, the Ministry continues to
afford Telmex advantages over competitors by failing to imple-
ment a pro-competitive regulatory structure. Consequently, ex-
isting "competitors" are left without the opportunity to fairly
participate in the market, and consumers continue to pay egre-
gious fees for telephone services and equipment.
C. The Statistics: Negative Implications of the Telmex
Monopoly on Consumers Compared to Telecom Systems
in Other American Countries
Mexico is one of several countries in Central and South
America that experienced drastic changes during the last dec-
ade of the 20th century with respect to liberalizing the telecom-
munications markets. By comparing the results of Mexico's
supposed "opening" of the market in 1997 to the results of other
Latin American countries with truly opened markets, it be-
comes clear that Mexican businesses and consumers could be
enjoying greater benefits today. However, as Mexico has en-
joyed mere quasi-liberalization, the resulting benefits have
been half-baked at best.
First, it is argued that competitive markets grow faster
than markets stymied by monopolies. Mexico enjoyed a 4% in-
crease (from 7-11%) in the number of main telephone lines fol-
lowing the privatization of Telmex in 1990 and the opening of
the market in 1997. However, due to concessions granted to
Telmex, particularly with respect to the basic telecommunica-
tions sector upon privatization (i.e., exclusivity rights), such
figures are bare compared to countries in which no exclusivity
rights were granted. For example, upon privatization, growth
in Chile accelerated to 21% per year, largely due to the fact that
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competitors were free to enter the market faced with far fewer
practical restrictions than in Mexico. 156 Thus, had COFETE
successfully tamed Telmex after opening the market, competi-
tion today would be at an advanced stage resulting in greater
access to telephone lines than consumers in Mexico currently
enjoy. At 11%, Mexico has one of the lowest fixed lines percent-
ages in the Americas compared to Uruguay at 28% and the U.S.
and Canada at 66% and 64%, respectively. 157
Next, it is argued that competition results in faster align-
ment of prices with cost. Chili's long distance rates were com-
parable to those of competitive markets in the developed world
almost immediately upon opening the market. However, in
Mexico, where Telmex continues to reign even after privatiza-
tion, the cost of calling the United States is approximately three
times higher than for Americans calling into Mexico.' 58 Thus,
through Telmex's continued refusal to open the market, U.S.
consumers calling Mexico continue to pay egregiously high
prices while consumers within Mexico pay super-egregiously
high prices compared to average rates charged in competitive
markets.
Third, it is argued that competition enhances opportunities
for providing better quality and inexpensive services with re-
spect to innovative and enhanced uses of telecommunications.
Aside from the introduction of the internet into Latin America
in the mid 1990s, the introduction of satellite systems, as well
as cellular phone services and equipment are examples of newly
explored telecommunications areas. The statistics with respect
to internet users in Mexico are deplorable: while Chili already
enjoyed statistics of approximately 20 internet users per 100
PCs in 1996, Mexico and other countries, slower to realize the
benefits of privatization and true open markets, were struggling
to attain 10 users per 100 PCs. 159 The saga on internet oppor-
tunities in Mexico continues even today because of Telmex's re-
fusal to follow domestic and international anti-competition
laws.
156 See LUIGI MANZETTi, REGULATORY POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA: POST PRIVA-
TIZATION REALITIES, CHAPTER 8, REGULATING THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR:
THE EXPERIENCE OF LATIN AMERICA, 203 (2000).
157 See Stevens, supra note 83, at 24.
158 See MANZErrI, supra note 156, at 203.
159 See id. at 204.
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It appears that Telmex has made a commitment to conquer
any international internet service provider (ISP) that poses a
threat to Carlos Slim's latest acquired ISP jewel, Prodigy. In
order to keep Prodigy literally next to none, Telmex continues to
refuse providing lines to competitive ISPs, thus leaving compet-
itors and entrants into this astronomically growing field with-
out viable opportunities to expand or create customer bases.'60
Consequently, while Prodigy enjoys increased expansion in the
market manifested by an additional 30,000 customers per
month, 1 1 competing ISPs can do little but stand by as consum-
ers are forced to reach deeper into their pockets for internet ser-
vice. Were Mexican consumers granted the opportunity to
choose among a selection of ISPs, the cost of access would be
lower, which in turn would open the door to an increased
amount of internet users within Mexico. Given the vast realm
of benefits enjoyed by internet users, particularly in business
and educational fields, the detrimental effects to Mexican con-
sumers without internet access are far greater than simply
monetary costs. 162
D. Recent Developments in the Struggle to Introduce
Competition into the Mexican Telecommunications
Industry
1. Telmex Applies a 'Band-Aid' Approach to Temporarily
Calm the Storm
After USTR Barshefsky strongly advocated disgruntled
U.S. companies' positions at the WTO for most of the year 2000
in an effort to prod Mexico to remove barriers to competition in
the $12 billion telecommunications industry, the U.S. adopted a
less aggressive approach following Telmex's "unofficial" recogni-
tion of its anti-competitive behavior. The WTO case was set to
go to arbitration to determine whether the Mexican government
had made sufficient, if any, effective changes in enforcing the
FTL. However, the U.S. eased the pressure in January of 2001
160 See Gabrielle, supra note 124, at 2.
161 See id.
162 Aside from business losses, a lack of being "on line" results in lower com-
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after Telmex signed several agreements with long-distance ri-
vals to settle legal clashes over interconnection rates. 163
In a supposed second effort to open the Mexican market (af-
ter the debacle in 1997), the two major U.S. constituent compa-
nies in Mexico, Avantel and Alestra (i.e., Worldcom and AT&T),
agreed to pay Telmex $137 million in unpaid fees while Telmex,
Avantel and Alestra agreed to drop lingering lawsuits, which
had maimed the industry since 1997.164 Additionally, Telmex
agreed not to challenge an FTL mandate to cut interconnection
fees and allow Avantel and Alestra access to connections and
digital trunking, which U.S. constituent companies had been
denied in the past.165 Telmex followed through with its band-
aid approach by entering into additional bi-lateral agreements
on the same prevailing interconnection and access issues with
smaller competitors. 166 Although the Mexican Telecommunica-
tions Minister, Pedro Cerisola, denied that Telmex's "coopera-
tion" in reaching these agreements was an effort to discourage
U.S. pursuit of the WTO arbitration decision, Telmex officials
stated that "the accord is likely to resolve most U.S.
concerns."167
2. The Ultimate Victims Remain Consumers and Less
Influential Companies
Despite Telmex's scanty attempts to temporarily circum-
vent its obligations under the new FTL and the WTO, Telmex
continues to monopolize the Mexican telecommunications mar-
ket. Thus, investors and - consequently - consumers con-
tinue to be unable to reap the benefits that accompany a truly
competitive market. Since the continued reign of Telmex makes
it impossible for investors to enter the market on a level playing
163 See Mobile News, Telmex and Rivals Sign Pact to Open Mexico's $12 bil-
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field, consumers are left with few options, high prices, and poor
quality of telecommunications services. 168
The statistics still speak for Telmex's continued anti-com-
petitive behavior: Telmex dominates 58% of the market for in-
ternational calls originating in Mexico; 68% of the domestic
long-distance market; 97% of the local market;169 and is the
largest internet provider. 170 Consequently, one analyst for
Merrill Lynch & Co., points out that "[alnyone who wants to do
business in the telecom industry in Mexico has to do business
with Telmex."171
Although the agreements Telmex reached with the larger
competitors in the industry temporarily silenced Alestra's and
Worldcom's cries for fair play, such agreements failed to ad-
dress virtually any of the smaller companies' practical needs.
According to a spokesperson of the smaller long-distance com-
pany Marcatel, "we were 100 meters under the water, now we
are 10 meters under. We are still drowning, but not at the same
depth."1 72 It is unfortunate for the smaller companies that
Alestra and Worldcom, the two most influential companies,
have been placated by their agreements with Telmex. Since
less influential companies are less likely to successfully lobby
the USTR to continue applying pressure on Mexico, the door to
fair and effective entrance into the market for smaller compa-
nies remains closed.
3. The Bottom Line: Mexican Exercise of Fictitious
Competition Continues
Despite recent attempts to curb Telmex's dominance, the
agreements reached among a small percentage of the companies
in the market effectively circumvented the underlying issues at
the heart of the anti-competition problem in the Mexican tele-
168 Mexicans are still very unsatisfied with "the phone company." Although
the telecom infrastructure has improved, consumers continue to "fume over mys-
tery charges and insistent dinnertime calls urging them to return to Telmex long-
distance service." See Elizabeth Malkin, Telmex: Mexico's 800-Pound Gorilla: Its
Quasi-monopoly is a Safe Haven for Investors, Bus. WK. ONLINE (June 18, 2001), at
http//:www.businessweek.commagazine.content01_25/b3737725.htm/.
169 See id.
170 See Ortiz, supra note 166, at 1.
171 Malkin, supra note 168, at 1.
172 Ortiz, supra note 166, at 2.
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communications industry. Introducing a "cease fire" between
Telmex and its two rivals failed to result in true opportunity for
new companies to enter the market. Even though such agree-
ments may result in some individual benefits to the involved
companies, "they are not changes that give security and inspira-
tion to investors." 173 Another indication of how these agree-
ments failed to attract investment into Mexico is the fact that
President Fox's campaign promises of a continued flow of in-
vestment capital into the Mexican telecom industry fell far
short of his expectations.
Additionally, COFETE remains a toothless agency, leaving
potential market entrants with little choice but to hope that the
new round of laws currently being drafted by the Communica-
tions Ministry and Congress will provide for a true competitive
environment in Mexico. These new regulations will supposedly
give COFETE the power to acknowledge Telmex's monopoly of-
ficially and actually sanction Telmex by assigning the company
handicaps until a level playing field is provided for in the mar-
ket.174 Whether such rules will enjoy greater success than the
former "new rules" remains to be seen. Without question,
Telmex's simple disablement of the original rules provides
neither confidence to foreign investors nor incentive for Telmex
to change its attitude toward competitors.17 5
In sum, the Mexican telecommunications market is still not
attractive to foreign investors seeking an open market, a fair
playing field, and healthy competition. Despite allegedly suc-
cessful recent direct attempts to reach agreements with Telmex,
and the indirect pressures exerted on the Mexican government
via diplomatic channels and the WTO, the competitive environ-
ment that Telmex and COFETE argue to be fostering is a prac-
tical fiction. The effects remain two-fold: Telecom investors are
discouraged from investing in Mexico and consumers continue
to suffer the negative implications of the lingering Telmex
monopoly.
173 Id. at 2.
174 See id.
175 See id. at 3.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The Mexican government deserves some recognition for ad-
dressing an issue that has plagued the Mexican telecommunica-
tions industry for more than half a century, namely the Telmex
telecom monopoly. Following years of procurement of protec-
tionist attitudes toward FDI, Mexico went through a number of
administrative changes in an effort to liberalize foreign invest-
ment generally, resulting in the enactment of the FIL in 1993.
Additionally, the Mexican government opened the doors to for-
eign investment in the telecommunications sector by privatiz-
ing Telmex and by subsequently passing the FTL in 1995. To
foreign investors, these new laws suggested that Mexico had fi-
nally adopted a predictable, transparent, and reliable system,
which set the stage for healthy competition in Mexico's telecom-
munications market. With Mexico's accession to the WTO and
its vicarious commitment to the DSU, foreign investors in tele-
communications were further assured that capital could safely
flow into Mexico. Consequently, astronomical amounts of U.S.
capital entered the Mexican telecom industry.
Despite Mexico's significant administrative changes, the
Mexican government has been unable to tame the telecommuni-
cations giant to date because Telmex continues to enjoy signifi-
cant liberties in a manner that effectively contravenes the
anticipated free market concept of competition. Consequently,
the market enjoys slower growth than in comparable countries,
the quality of telecom services is poor, and costs remain high.
Additionally, lofty interconnection and termination rates con-
tinue to plague consumers.
Unless the U.S. goes forward with WTO proceedings in or-
der to remedy the continued lack of competitive conditions in
the telecommunications market, Mexico's failure to enforce
anti-competition rules (the FTL and WTO obligations) will con-
tinue. Consequently, foreign investors who have entered, or
would like to enter the Mexican market are competitively disad-
vantaged while Telmex continues to dictate its unofficial mo-
nopoly. Until Telmex is disarmed and forced to play by the
rules, the Mexican legislative changes merely present a facade,
as opposed to an effective regulating tool. While it is pertinent
to note that investors continue to lose business opportunities in
2002]
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Mexico, the ultimate losers remain the consumers who, without
choices, end up paying higher prices and receive lower quality
service from Telmex.
44http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol14/iss2/1
